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Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law 
Carissa Byrne Hessick* 
This brief response to Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics, 
an article by Stefan Gries and Brian Slocum, explains why corpus 
linguistics represents a radical break from current statutory 
interpretation practice, and it argues that corpus linguistics ought not 
be adopted as an interpretive theory for criminal laws. Corpus 
linguistics has superficial appeal because it promises to increase 
predictability and to decrease the role of judges’ personal preferences in 
statutory interpretation. But there are reasons to doubt that corpus 
linguistics can achieve these goals. More importantly, corpus 
linguistics  sacrifices other, more important values, including notice 
and accountability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When read in isolation, Ordinary Meaning and Corpus 
Linguistics, an article by Stefan Gries and Brian Slocum,1 appears 
quite modest. It examines two prominent criminal law cases, and it 
uses a linguistics database to demonstrate how the judicial 
interpretations in those cases about the “ordinary meaning” of two 
statutory terms do not align with the most frequently used meanings 
of the terms. 
But the Gries and Slocum article should not be read in isolation. 
It should be read as part of a broader attempt to change modern 
statutory interpretation. A small group of legal scholars (and an even 
smaller group of judges) are advancing a new interpretive theory 
called “corpus linguistics.” Corpus linguists advocate treating the 
“ordinary meaning” inquiry in statutory interpretation as an 
empirical question: the ordinary meaning should be ascertained by 
consulting a linguistics database to determine how frequently a term 
is used in a certain manner.2 
 
 1.  Stefan Th. Gries & Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics, 
2017 BYU L. REV 1417. 
 2.  The leading proponents of corpus linguistics as an interpretive theory are Thomas 
Lee, a justice on the Utah Supreme Court, and Stephen Mouritsen. See, e.g., Justice Thomas 
Lee & Stephen Mouritsen, The Path Forward for Law and Corpus Linguistics, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/08 
/11/the-path-forward-for-law-and-corpus-linguistics/?utm_term=.0d9ec9a77315 [hereinafter 
Lee & Mouritsen, The Path Forward] (“[W]e see corpus linguistic analysis playing a central 
role in legal interpretation going forward. When problems of ambiguity in legal language arise, 
we expect judges and lawyers to turn increasingly to data from linguistic databases and less to 
mere dictionaries. Corpus linguistics will form an important part of the future of legal 
interpretation.”); Justice Thomas Lee & Stephen Mouritsen, Linguistic Corpora and the 
Evolving Study of Language and Meaning, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/08/09/linguistic-corpora-and-the-
evolving-study-of-language-and-meaning/?utm_term=.f56cb676f54b [hereinafter Lee & 
Mouritsen, Evolving Study] (arguing that “a complete theory of ordinary meaning requires us to 
take into account the comparative frequency of different senses of words, the (syntactic, 
semantic and pragmatic) context of an utterance, its historical usage and the speech 
community in which it was uttered” (emphasis added)); see also Stephen C. Mouritsen, The 
Dictionary is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain 
Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 1953–54 (describing an argument to determine the 
“ordinary meaning” of a statutory term by reference to “common usage” as “a theory of 
ordinary meaning”). 
 
6.HESSICK_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2018 4:05 PM 
1503 Corpus Linguistics and Criminal Law 
 1505 
This brief response explains why corpus linguistics represents a 
radical break from current interpretive theories. It also argues that 
corpus linguistics ought not be adopted as an interpretive theory for 
criminal laws.3 Corpus linguistics has superficial appeal because it 
promises to increase predictability and to decrease the role of judges’ 
personal preferences in statutory interpretation. But there are reasons 
to doubt that corpus linguistics can achieve these goals. More 
importantly, in attempting to achieve these goals, corpus linguis-
tics  sacrifices other, more important values, including notice 
and accountability. 
I. “ORDINARY MEANING” AND EMPIRICISM 
It is easy to overlook that corpus linguistics is an interpretive 
theory, rather than simply an interdisciplinary methodology, because 
it bills itself as providing an answer to a question that many current 
interpretive theories ask: What is the “plain” or “ordinary” meaning 
of the statutory text?4 Indeed, some who advocate for the use of 
 
But there are others who have written about corpus linguistics who have advocated its use 
as an interdisciplinary tool, rather than as a legal theory. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan & 
Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in Legal Interpretation, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1311, 
1356 (“At all times, it should be kept in mind that linguistic corpora provide a tool for those 
engaged in statutory interpretation, but they say nothing about when this tool is most useful. 
That judgment must come from a combination of legal decisions about whether the 
distribution of word usage should determine the outcome of a case, a further legal decision 
about what ‘ordinary meaning’ should mean in a legal context, and appropriate use of a corpus 
when one is used.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 
285 (2017) (identifying corpus linguistics as one of a number of tools that can be used to 
“check” the meanings given by others). 
 3.  I limit my arguments in this Article to the appropriateness of using corpus 
linguistics to interpret criminal laws. One of my major criticisms of corpus linguistics is its 
impact on notice, and the need for notice is particularly acute when it comes to criminal laws. 
See Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA. L. 
REV. 335, 347–48 (2005) (explaining that concerns about punishment without notice have 
resulted in “special rules for the construction of penal statutes”). But not all of the objections 
that I raise are necessarily limited to criminal laws. 
 4.  Different theories ask this question for different purposes. For textualists, the plain 
meaning may control. See William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning 
Rule, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 539, 541 (2017). For purposivists, the plain meaning serves as a 
limit on possible interpretations. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL 
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 112 (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
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corpus linguistics describe it as a tool that can be used by textualists. 
And I agree that corpus linguistics may be a useful tool for 
identifying permissible meanings of a statutory term. But not 
everyone who promotes corpus linguistics in the law does so as a 
mere tool for identifying permissible meanings. Some advocate the 
use of corpus linguistics as a new theory about how statutes ought to 
be interpreted.5  
To understand how corpus linguistics functions as an interpretive 
theory, it is helpful to contrast it with textualism.6 Textualism is a 
method of statutory interpretation in which statutes are construed, at 
least initially, according to the “plain” or “ordinary” meaning of the 
text.7 Textualists will consider other sources—such as legislative 
history, policy considerations, practice, or canons of statutory 
construction—only if the meaning of the statutory language cannot 
be ascertained from the text itself.8 In other words, textualists will 
look first at the ordinary meaning of a statute, and they will not 
consult nontextual sources if the meaning of the statute is apparent 
from the text itself. 
Corpus linguistics reframes the “plain” or “ordinary” meaning 
inquiry in two ways. First, it claims that ordinary meaning is an 
empirical question. Second, it tells us that this empirical question 
ought to be answered by how frequently a term is used in a 
particular way. Both of these analytical moves represent significant 
departures from current theories of statutory interpretation, 
including textualism, and they render statutory interpretation 
essentially unrecognizable. 
 
 5.  See supra note 2. 
 6.  Corpus linguistics is often discussed in terms of how it compliments textualism. See, 
e.g., Corpus Linguistics and Legal Interpretation–Event Audio/Video, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Jan. 
23, 2017) (statement of Justice Thomas Lee at 23:20–25:00), https://fedsoc.org/comm 
entary/videos/corpus-linguistics-and-legal-interpretation-event-audio-video?autoplay=1 (disc-
ussing how corpus linguistics allows the law to deliver on the promise of textualism). 
 7.  See Baude & Doerfler, supra note 4, at 543–44. 
 8.  See id. 
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Courts do not usually treat ordinary meaning as an empirical 
question.9 Sometimes courts use the term “ordinary meaning” to 
refer to whether a meaning is permitted,10 sometimes to refer to 
whether the meaning is obvious,11 and sometimes to refer to the 
meaning that the hypothetical reasonable person would give to the 
statutory language.12 None of these usages is empirical—or at least 
they are not readily quantifiable. Nor does the academic literature on 
textualism treat ordinary meaning as an empirical question subject 
to quantification.13 
Gries and Slocum are actually quite careful about the empiricism 
of corpus linguistics. They make clear that “the proper standard for 
designating some permissible meaning as the ordinary meaning” of a 
statutory term is a question for the courts, not a question that 
corpus analysis itself can answer.14 And they take pains not to assume 
that, when judges seek the ordinary meaning of a term, the answer 
they seek is necessarily empirical.15 
 
 9.  A fact that corpus linguists admit. See, e.g., Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and 
Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics as an Empirical Path to Plain Meaning, 13 COLUM. 
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 156, 163–80 (2011) [hereinafter Mouritsen, Hard Cases] (describing 
the various nonempirical approaches that courts have taken regarding the “plain” or “ordinary 
meaning” question over time). 
 10.  See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 230–31 (1993). 
 11.  See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989). 
 12.  See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2090–91 (2014). 
 13.  See Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for 
Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1244–45 (2015) (“In debates about 
legal meaning and interpretation, participants’ references to legal meaning sometimes invoke 
or appeal to each of the following: (1) semantic or literal meaning; (2) contextual meaning as 
framed by shared presuppositions of speakers and listeners, including shared presuppositions 
about application and nonapplication; (3) real conceptual meaning; (4) intended meaning; (5) 
reasonable meaning; and (6) interpreted meaning.”); id. at 1239 (noting that “proponents of 
leading interpretive theories sometimes appear to” “question whether statutory and 
constitutional provisions have uniquely correct meanings that exist as a matter of prelegal, 
linguistic fact”). 
 14.  Gries & Slocum, supra note 1, at 1470. 
 15.  E.g., id. at 1434–35 (observing that in deciding the ordinary meaning question the 
“question might be framed as empirical in nature and based on an accurate understanding of 
language” (emphasis added)); id. at 1435 (“To the extent that ordinary meaning is an empirical 
question, it would seem that courts and others should consider the possibility that other 
determinants might be better suited to the task.” (emphasis added)). The closest that Gries 
and Slocum come to endorsing the idea that ordinary meaning ought to be treated as an 
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Gries and Slocum’s modesty about whether textualism’s quest 
for ordinary meaning is an empirical question is not shared by all 
corpus linguists. The first law review article to promote corpus 
linguistics in legal interpretation claimed that ordinary meaning 
ought to be treated as an empirical question—in particular a 
question about frequency.16 This claim has been repeated multiple 
times since then.17 But corpus linguists’ explanation about why 
“ordinary meaning” ought to be the most frequently used meaning 
is not very persuasive. Proponents of corpus linguistics believe that 
the frequency with which words are used in various nonlegal 
publications can tell us how a member of the public would 
understand those words when they appear in statutes.18 While there 
are good reasons for courts to interpret statutes—especially criminal 
statutes—in a fashion that is consistent with how an ordinary 
member of the public would understand the statute,19 the frequency 
with which a term is used does not give us that information. 
To be clear, corpus linguists think that the context in which a 
statutory term is used also matters in determining “ordinary 
meaning.”20 But that is not what corpus linguistics contributes to 
 
empirical question is when they state that “[ordinary meaning] would seem to be subject in 
some way to the empirical verification that corpus analysis can provide.” Id. at 1470. 
 16.  Mouritsen, supra note 2, at 1953–54. Mouritsen relies, in part, on a dictionary 
definition to argue that “ordinary” ought to be interpreted to mean most commonly used. 
(This reliance on the dictionary seems almost ironic given that the article is devoted to 
criticizing dictionaries as a source for legal meaning.) 
 17.  E.g., Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 5) (available at https://www.ssrn.com/abstract 
=2937468) [hereinafter Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning] (“When we speak of 
ordinary meaning we are asking an empirical question—about the sense of a word or phrase 
that is most likely implicated in a given linguistic context.”); Lee & Mouritsen, Evolving Study, 
supra note 2 (“[A] complete theory of ordinary meaning requires us to take into account 
the  comparative frequency of different senses of words, the (syntactic, semantic and 
pragmatic)  context of an utterance, its historical usage and the speech community in which it 
was  uttered.”). 
 18.  E.g., Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 17, at 24. 
 19.  These reasons include notice and accountability. See infra text accompanying 
notes 48–49. 
 20.  See, e.g., Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 17. 
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statutory interpretation—everyone thinks that context matters.21 
What corpus linguistics adds to statutory interpretation is the idea 
that the ordinary meaning ought to be determined according to the 
frequency with which a word is used a particular way.  
How often a term appears in newspapers, magazines, or other 
publications is a separate inquiry from how members of the public 
would understand that term when used in a statute. Imagine, for 
example, a dispute over the scope of a statute that provides relief for 
flood victims. The dispute centers around how much water must 
have accumulated in an area in order for an event to be considered a 
flood. A database search of how often the word “flood” is used to 
refer to very large amounts of accumulated water will doubtlessly be 
skewed by the fact that instances of extensive flooding—such as New 
Orleans after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 or Houston during 
Hurricane Harvey in 2017—will receive far more media coverage 
than other events. Indeed, a corpus analysis may demonstrate that 
seventy percent of all mentions of the word “flood” occur in the 
context of these superstorms. But that does not tell us whether the 
average American would understand the statutory term “flood” to 
include three inches of water in a homeowner’s basement after a 
neighboring water main burst.22 
As the flood example illustrates, the frequency with which a word 
appears in print is separate from how an ordinary citizen would 
understand that word. As Oliver Wendell Holmes explained, when a 
criminal statute uses a word or a phrase, that word or phrase “calls 
up the picture” of something—and it is that picture that the law 
 
 21.  See, e.g., FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 308 (2012) (“Context, of course, is 
relevant to statutory interpretation; it may provide clues that Congress did not employ a word 
or phrase in its ordinary meaning.”); Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009) (stating that 
“statutory interpretation turns on ‘the language itself, the specific context in which that 
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole’” (quoting Robinson v. 
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997))). 
 22.  Lawrence Solan and Tammy Gales make a similar point in their contribution to this 
issue—that corpus data may reflect the fact that a given sense of a certain term is a more 
factually common iteration of that term in the real world. Solan & Gales, supra note 2, at 
1314, 1356. My point is not simply about real world occurrence, but also about how often an 
event receives media coverage. 
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should be interpreted to mean.23 This mental picture is what some 
call a “prototype.”24 As Gries and Slocum tell us, corpus linguistics 
“can provide clues” about prototypes.25 But, as the flood example 
demonstrates, sometimes the “clues” that corpus linguistics provides 
will point us in the wrong direction.26 
Although the Supreme Court has been far from consistent in its 
use of the term “ordinary meaning,” textualists often use the term to 
refer to the meaning that is intended by a reasonable speaker or the 
meaning that is understood by a reasonable listener.27 In other 
words, textualism’s use of “ordinary meaning” is intended to answer 
the prototype question. But corpus linguists do not view the 
reasonable person as an appropriate alternative to empirical questions 
of frequency. Instead they denounce the reasonable person standard 
as nothing more than “judicial intuition,”28 which is insufficiently 
 
 23.  McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 26–27 (1931). 
 24.  See Solan & Gales, supra note 2, at 1354 (explaining why the giraffe is the 
prototypical tall animal). 
 25.  Gries & Slocum, supra note 1, at 1441 (“[Corpus linguistics] can provide clues as 
to what the most prototypical meaning of an expression might be based on various factors 
(e.g., highest frequency, most even dispersion, earliest acquired, central in network of senses, 
meaning with the highest number of features with the highest cue validities).”) 
 26.  At times, corpus linguists appear to acknowledge that frequency analysis does not 
necessarily identify a linguistic prototype. See, e.g., Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary 
Meaning, supra note 17, at 10–11 (treating a linguistic prototype as a different “sense” of the 
term “ordinary meaning” than the frequency with which a term is used); Mouritsen, Hard 
Cases, supra note 9, at 181–201 (treating linguistic prototypes and corpus frequency analyses 
as separate inquiries). 
 27.  For example, Judge Easterbrook has said: 
We should look at the statutory structure and hear the words as they would sound 
in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable user of words. Words appeal to the 
reasonable man of tort law; private language and subjective intents should be put 
aside. The meaning of statutes is to be found not in the subjective, multiple mind of 
Congress but in the understanding of the objectively reasonable person. 
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988). Similarly, Justice Scalia referred to the interpretive process as the 
search for “the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law.” 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
17 (1997). 
 28.  See Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 17, at 15; Mouritsen, 
Hard Cases, supra note 9, at 161, 176. 
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objective29 and does not result in predictable outcomes.30 Some 
corpus linguists have been quite clear that they prefer corpus 
linguistics to the reasonable person standard because corpus 
linguistics minimizes judicial discretion.31 In particular, these corpus 
linguists object to the reasonable person standard because the 
standard is “idealized” and therefore it “has little or nothing to do 
with the actual meaning intended by a legislator or understood by 
the public.”32  
It is true that judges will not always be able to accurately 
determine what the majority of Americans believe is the linguistic 
prototype of a statutory term. Instead, judges will likely identify their 
own linguistic prototypes. And it is also true that judges will—and 
do—disagree about the ordinary meaning of statutory terms.33 But 
the idea that judges are not competent to say what a statute means is 
a radical—and in my mind dangerous—doctrinal path to take. The 
idea that the traditional ordinary meaning inquiry is somehow 
inferior to a frequency analysis because judges might rely on their 
intuition—that is, their professional judgment—rejects the very 
foundation of the judicial role. 
The Constitution assigns “the judicial power” to the courts. The 
judicial power has been understood for centuries to include the 
 
 29.  See Mouritsen, Hard Cases, supra note 9, at 174–80; see also Lee & Mouritsen, 
Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 17, at 5 (stating that “empirical methods utilized by 
linguists . . . may help us do a better job of delivering on the promise of an objective inquiry 
into ordinary meaning”). 
 30.  See Mouritsen, Hard Cases, supra note 9, at 205 (stating that corpus linguistics 
“improve[s] the predictability and consistency of judicial decision making”). 
 31.  See, e.g., Corpus Linguistics and Legal Interpretation–Event Audio/Video, 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Jan. 23, 2017) (statement of Justice Thomas Lee at 24:10), 
https://fedsoc.org/commentary/videos/corpus-linguistics-and-legal-interpretation-event-
audio-video?autoplay=1 (praising corpus linguistics because it minimizes judicial discretion). 
 32.  Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 17, at 21–22. In an 
earlier article, Mouritsen expressed concern about judges employing the reasonable person test 
because they are unlikely to be very good at estimating how often a term is used a particular 
way. Mouritsen, Hard Cases, supra note 9, at 175–76. But that concern assumes that 
frequency is an appropriate measure for original meaning. 
 33.  See generally Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F. Guzior & Anup Malani, Ambiguity About 
Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 257 (2010) 
(showing disagreement over whether text is ambiguous). 
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power to interpret laws.34 And the power to interpret statutes has 
always been understood to require more than simply reading the 
text.35 In recent years, judges have often used their interpretive 
power to read statutes as they would be understood by the public. 
But in so doing, judges have not doubted their authority to rely on 
their own judgment about what the public understanding is likely to 
be. Nor have they shied away from using interpretation to further 
other goals when they believed those goals were warranted.36 
Seeking to prevent judges from relying on their own judgment in 
statutory interpretation is, in a very real sense, a rejection of the 
judicial power to interpret the laws. Judges have long relied on their 
professional judgment when interpreting laws. Oliver Wendell 
Holmes endorsed this role of judgment in interpretation when he 
said: “Behind the logical form [of statutory interpretation] lies a 
 
 34.  See, e.g., 5 MATHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 217 (3d ed., 
London, J. Worrall & Co. 1770) (“It is the [p]rovince of the [j]ustices to determine, what the 
[m]eaning of a [w]ord or [s]entence in an [a]ct of Parliament is.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, 
at 381 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar 
province of the courts.”); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 98 
(Yale Univ. Press 1966) (statement of Rufus King) (“Judges ought to be able to expound the 
law as it should come before them”); see also Philip Hamburger, A Tale of Two Paradigms: 
Judicial Review and Judicial Duty, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1162, 1171–72 (2010) (arguing 
that courts historically exercised independent judgment in interpretation); Robert J. Pushaw, 
Jr., A Neo-Federalist Analysis of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1515, 1542 
(2007) (“By 1787, ‘judicial power’ had acquired a core meaning that has lasted to this day: 
rendering a binding judgment after impartially interpreting and applying the law in light of 
the facts presented in litigation.”). 
 35.  See, e.g., Comm’r v. Ickelheimer, 132 F.2d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, J., 
dissenting) (“Compunctions about judicial legislation are right enough as long as we have any 
genuine doubt as to the breadth of the legislature’s intent; and no doubt the most important 
single factor in ascertaining its intent is the words it employs. But the colloquial words of a 
statute have not the fixed and artificial content of scientific symbols; they have a penumbra, a 
dim fringe, a connotation, for they express an attitude of will, into which it is our duty to 
penetrate and which we must enforce ungrudgingly when we can ascertain it, regardless of 
imprecision in its expression.”); Nine Speeches by Justice Roger J. Traynor, in 8 CALIFORNIA 
LEGAL HISTORY 211, 218 (Selma Moidel Smith ed., 2013) (“‘The law is not an encyclopedia 
to which lawyers may rush,’ . . . but rather, it thrives on ‘conflict and fresh interpretation.’”). 
 36.  For example, the courts will construe statutes to avoid constitutional doubts, Clark 
v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–82 (2005), promote federalism, BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 
511 U.S. 531, 544–45 (1994), and achieve a series of other goals, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. 
& Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional 
Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 598–611 (1992) (cataloguing various interpretive goals). 
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judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing 
legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, 
it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole 
proceeding.”37 Similarly, Felix Frankfurter said that “the final 
rendering of the meaning of a statute is an act of judgment.”38 
Of course, disagreements have arisen over how judges ought to 
interpret laws. There are differing opinions over, for example, what 
sources of meaning judges ought to consult and whether judges 
ought to consider the policy implications of their interpretive 
choices.39 But so long as judges are declaring what they believe the 
statute says—as opposed to declaring what they believe it ought to 
say—they are well within their constitutional sphere. 
One suspects that this negative attitude towards judicial 
judgment is related to the omnipresent concern in modern legal 
thought about the counter-majoritarian difficulty—that judges might 
use their interpretive powers to usurp the policy powers of the 
elected branches.40 Is it possible that judges will allow their personal 
preferences to color their interpretations of laws? Of course it is. But 
that possibility can be—and is—already guarded against in the 
system through various accountability mechanisms. The practice of 
opinion writing creates accountability because it requires judges to 
explain their decisions.41 The norm of respecting precedent provides 
further accountability because judges know that their decisions will 
have effects beyond the particular case.42 Because judges remain 
accountable for their decisions, they are more likely to decide cases 
 
 37.  Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 
466 (1897). 
 38.  Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 
527, 531 (1947). 
 39.  See Fallon, supra note 13, at 1287–88. 
 40.  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (2d ed. 1986). 
 41.  See Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1571, 1574 (1988) (discussing these two types of accountability). 
 42.  See William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent–
Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1167, 1204 (1978) (explaining how the precedential value of an opinion increases 
judicial accountability). 
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in a disinterested fashion. And by both explaining why they 
interpreted a statute a particular way and by being bound by that 
decision in future cases, judges ensure a significant amount of 
predictability in the law. Even if we want to further maximize 
predictability and minimize the possibility that interpretation will be 
driven by idiosyncratic judicial preferences, there are several reasons 
why performing a frequency analysis using a corpus linguistics 
database is not the path to take. 
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH FREQUENCY 
Corpus linguistics tells us that the ordinary meaning of a 
statutory term ought to be resolved by looking to the frequency with 
which a term is used a certain way.43 This is a problematic theory for 
the interpretation of criminal laws because it creates problems of 
notice and accountability. 
Notice is one of the bedrock principles of modern criminal law.44 
Criminal laws must give us fair notice of what conduct is permitted 
and what conduct is prohibited.45 Without such notice, an individual 
may accidentally engage in illegal conduct,46 or she may choose to 
 
 43.  To be clear, corpus linguists do not look at frequency only. They say that “a 
complete theory of ordinary meaning requires us to take into account the comparative 
frequency of different senses of words, the (syntactic, semantic and pragmatic) context of an 
utterance, its historical usage and the speech community in which it was uttered.” Lee & 
Mouritsen, Evolving Study, supra note 2. As noted above, everyone agrees that context is 
important. See supra text accompanying note 20. To the extent that corpus linguists constrain 
their frequency analyses according to “its historical usage and the speech community in which 
[a term] was uttered,” that does not alleviate the notice and accountability concerns addressed 
in this section. Lee & Mouritsen, Evolving Study, supra note 2. 
 44.  See Robinson, supra note 3, at 364. 
 45.  Laws that fail to give such notice are frequently invalidated under the vagueness 
doctrine. E.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 (1974) (“The [vagueness] doctrine 
incorporates notions of fair notice or warning.”). 
 46.  See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (“[B]ecause we assume 
that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the 
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he 
may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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avoid large swaths of legal conduct because she does not know for 
certain whether such conduct is permitted.47 
Corpus linguistics is not well designed to provide notice because 
the meaning of a statute depends on a database search and an 
analysis of those results. When it comes to notice, we care about the 
notice that is provided to members of the general public.48 But 
members of the general public cannot be expected to perform their 
own corpus searches and analyses. The process described in the 
corpus linguistics literature appears quite involved, and it hardly 
seems accessible to the average American.49  
Indeed, there is a debate within the corpus linguistics field over 
whether attorneys and judges are qualified to perform corpus 
searches and analyses.50 Even those who believe that attorneys and 
judges are able to perform corpus searches and analyses “concede 
that corpus linguistics is not ‘plug and play’ analysis” and that 
“[c]orpus data can be gathered and analyzed properly only with care 
and a little background and training in the underlying 
methodology.”51 But they nonetheless conclude that attorneys and 
judges will be able to effectively use corpus linguistics because of 
their legal training.52 
This debate over the competence of attorneys and judges makes 
clear that the average American would be unable to conduct an 
 
 47.  See United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36 (1963) (“[W]e are 
concerned with the vagueness of the statute ‘on its face’ because such vagueness may in itself 
deter constitutionally protected and socially desirable conduct.” (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 
310 U.S. 88, 98 (1940))). 
 48.  See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015) (stating that the 
Due Process Clause is violated if the government deprives a person of “life, liberty, or property 
under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct 
it punishes”). 
 49.  For an example of how one conducts such a search and the resulting analysis of one 
thousand randomly returned results, see Mouritsen, Hard Cases, supra note 9, at 194–201. 
 50.  For example, Gries and Slocum do not believe that attorneys or judges are 
qualified. Instead, Gries and Slocum advocate the involvement of expert linguists during 
litigation. Gries & Slocum, supra note 1, at 1469–71. In contrast, Lee and Mouritsen argue 
that attorneys and judges are competent to conduct these analyses. Though they agree that 
experts will improve judicial corpus analysis, they do not think that linguistics experts are 
necessary. Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 17, at 69–72. 
 51.  Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 17, at 69. 
 52.  Id. at 70–71. 
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appropriate search or analysis on her own. Most Americans do not 
have legal training, nor do they have any background or training in 
linguistic methodology. Thus, even corpus linguistics’ most ardent 
defenders must concede that the general public cannot competently 
use corpus linguistics in order to determine the meaning of a 
statutory term. And if the public does not know the meaning of a 
term in a criminal statute, then the statute does not give sufficient 
notice to satisfy due process.53 
In addition to failing to provide sufficient notice, the corpus 
methodology creates accountability concerns. If the meaning of a 
statute depends on a database search and an analysis of those results, 
then how will legislators know the scope of the laws that they enact 
and how will voters hold legislators responsible for their actions? 
Perhaps legislators could have their staff perform corpus searches and 
analyses, which would allow them to predict how courts will 
interpret the legislation that they enact. But unless voters conduct 
the same searches and analyses, they will not be able to hold their 
representatives accountable for the legislation that is passed. 
One might respond to these notice and accountability concerns 
by saying that members of the general public and legislators need 
not conduct their own corpus analyses because the frequency of 
usage reflected in the corpus database is likely to correspond to their 
own intuitions about the meaning of language.54 But this is at odds 
with a fundamental premise of corpus linguistics—that judicial 
intuition ought to be replaced with corpus analyses precisely because 
that intuition is unreliable.55 We have no reason to think that 
nonjudicial intuition will be more reliable.56 Also, the response either 
 
 53.  See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. 
 54.  Indeed, corpus linguists do not appear to contemplate members of the public 
performing these searches. See, e.g., Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 
17, at 69–72 (arguing that judges and lawyers have the necessary skills to perform competent 
corpus searches and analyses). 
 55.  See, e.g., Mouritsen, Hard Cases, supra note 9, at 175–78. 
 56.  See Lawrence Solan, Terri Rosenblatt & Daniel Osherson, False Consensus Bias in 
Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268, 1285–94 (2008) (demonstrating that 
both judges and laypeople overestimate whether others would agree with their interpretation 
of language). 
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proves too much or too little. If the results will always be the same as 
intuition, then corpus linguistics is unnecessary. If there are cases 
where corpus linguistics returns a different result than would the 
intuitions of lawmakers, judges, or voters, then corpus linguistics is a 
real threat to notice and accountability. 
Legislative accountability is not the only accountability problem 
posed by corpus linguistics. Telling judges to rely on frequency 
analyses rather than their professional judgment also creates an 
accountability deficit for judges. Corpus linguistics is attractive, in 
part, because it taps into our respect for science and data. Because 
human judgment is opaque, contested, and sometimes messy, when a 
person can point to objective facts to justify a decision, they will 
often do so.57 Those facts ease some of the pressure to justify an 
otherwise contestable decision.58 But as Kate Stith and José Cabranes 
have explained, justice may only be meted out by people. “By 
replacing the case-by-case exercise of human judgment with a 
mechanical calculus, we do not judge better or more objectively, nor 
do we judge worse. Instead, we cease to judge at all.”59 
Corpus linguists appear to assume that the personal judgment of 
judges is necessarily arbitrary, and thus indefensible from a rule of 
law perspective.60 But that is not so. Judgment is not “a matter of 
subjective ‘feeling.’”61 Judicial decisions have to be explained and 
justified. And judges know that they have to grapple with their past 
decisions in future cases. That is why, when judges interpret the 
meaning of a statute, they do not simply write “because I say so” in 
their opinions. 
 
 57.  Cf. Dan. M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 143-45 
(2007) (identifying (and criticizing) the tendency in liberal democracies to conduct policy 
debates by appealing to “objective procedures and criteria,” such as cost-benefit analysis, rather 
than to criteria related to morals or virtue). 
 58.  Cf. Fallon, supra note 13, at 1306 (noting that “any interpretive theory that 
requires normatively based case-by-case judgments cannot escape moral controversy”). 
 59.  KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 82 (1998). 
 60.  See supra notes 28–30. 
 61.  STITH & CABRANES, supra note 59, at 82. 
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But if we adopt corpus linguistics, then judges could replace 
their explanations and justifications with a short “because the corpus 
says so.” If judges’ interpretive task is reframed as conducting corpus 
searches or acting as a referee between competing experts, then 
judges will not bear the same responsibility to explain why and how a 
particular interpretation makes sense. 
Our constitutional system assigns judges the responsibility of 
interpreting laws for a reason: the Constitution divides authority 
between the three branches of government in order to promote 
individual liberty.62 Especially in the criminal law context, the 
separation of powers is assumed to promote individual liberty 
because all three branches must agree that conduct is deserving of 
punishment in order for a defendant to be convicted. If the 
legislature does not believe certain conduct should be punished, then 
it will exclude the conduct from its definition of crimes. If 
prosecutors do not believe that the particular circumstances of a case 
warrant punishment, then they will decline to bring charges in that 
case. And the judiciary will dismiss charges brought by prosecutors 
unless the defendants’ conduct is clearly prohibited by the 
criminal statute.63 
Because the separation of powers assumes that statutory 
interpretation is not merely a ministerial task, but rather one of 
several checks on the state’s power, judges must take responsibility 
for their decisions. Corpus linguistics mutes that constitutional role. 
It allows judges to see their role as counting database returns or 
evaluating expert credentials, rather than what it is: a separate and 
independent judgment about the legality or illegality of conduct. 
 
 62.  See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (“[W]e have not yet found a 
better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully 
crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 313 (James 
Madison) (“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same 
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may 
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers 
and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513 (1991). 
 63.  See Shima Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1071, 1083–84 (2017) (articulating these constitutional checks and noting that they 
have, at times, been underenforced). 
6.HESSICK_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2018 4:05 PM 
1503 Corpus Linguistics and Criminal Law 
 1519 
III. THE CORPUS LINGUISTICS CRITIQUE OF COSTELLO 
AND  SMITH 
Part of the obvious appeal of corpus linguistics is that it promises 
us right answers—answers that are derived from data, rather than 
fallible humans, and thus answers “that convey the impression of 
scientific precision and objectivity.”64 But as with any data analysis, 
corpus linguistics requires humans to make decisions that will 
affect—perhaps conclusively—the results of the data-based inquiry. 
The corpus linguistics analysis that Gries and Slocum conduct 
appears to illustrate the centrality of human decision making in 
corpus linguistics analysis. 
The two cases that Gries and Slocum analyze—United States v. 
Costello65 and Smith v. United States66—are familiar to those who 
study law and corpus linguistics.67 Costello, a Seventh Circuit opinion 
by Judge Posner, involved the scope of a federal statute that 
criminalized the harboring of undocumented aliens.68 In Costello, the 
court held that, in order to “harbor” an alien in violation of the 
statute, a defendant must deliberately safeguard or conceal the alien 
from authorities; merely sheltering an alien was not enough.69 Smith 
is a U.S. Supreme Court decision. It involved a statute that set a 
mandatory minimum sentence if a defendant “uses” a firearm 
“during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime.”70 The 
Smith Court held that a defendant who trades a gun for drugs “uses” 
a firearm and thus is subject to the mandatory minimum.71 
 
 64.  STITH & CABRANES, supra note 59, at 82. 
 65.  United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 66.  Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). 
 67.  See, e.g., Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 17, at 13–14, 
19–20, 52–53, 68 (analyzing Costello); Jennifer L. Mascott, The Dictionary as a Specialized 
Corpus, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1557, 1583–86 (analyzing Costello); Daniel Ortner, The Merciful 
Corpus: The Rule of Lenity, Ambiguity and Corpus Linguistics, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 101, 
124–27 (2016) (analyzing Smith); Solan & Gales, supra note 2, at 1314–15, 1352–53 
(analyzing Smith). 
 68.  8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012). 
 69.  Costello, 666 F.3d at 1050. 
 70.  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012). 
 71.  Smith, 508 U.S. at 241. 
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In their critique of Costello, Gries and Slocum criticize Judge 
Posner’s decision to use a Google search to bolster his decision to 
interpret the statutory term “harbor” to mean conceal or safeguard 
rather than to shelter. One of their criticisms is that Posner did not 
account for the meanings of the term “harbor” that did not include 
humans as an object.72 The most common uses of the term “harbor” 
involved people harboring emotions or perceptions.73 Judge Posner’s 
Google searches focused only on those usages that involve a person 
harboring another person, such as “harboring fugitives.”74 
Gries and Slocum do not fully explain why Judge Posner should 
have paid more attention to the usages that involved nonhuman 
objects.75 Given that the statute spoke in terms of harboring 
“aliens”—that is, noncitizens—one would expect that results about 
harboring emotions or perceptions were not relevant to the 
interpretive task: namely whether the statute included merely 
sheltering an alien. Gries and Slocum may have a perfectly defensible 
reason for why Judge Posner ought to include these other 
nonhuman object uses of “harbor” in his analysis. But those reasons 
are not obvious to lawyers. Indeed, when Lee and Mouritsen 
perform their own corpus analysis of “harbor,” they exclude all uses 
of the term that referred to feelings, perceptions, and other 
nonhuman, nonanimate, or nonconcrete objects.76 
To be clear, Gries and Slocum perform a secondary analysis of 
“harbor” that limits the analysis to usages in which humans are the 
 
 72.  Gries & Slocum, supra note 1, at 1447–51. 
 73.  Id. at 1449 (noting that such uses made up 44.3% of their search results). 
 74.  Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044. 
 75.  Gries and Slocum say that because harboring emotions and perceptions are the 
most frequently used meaning of the word, “the burden of proof was on Posner to show that 
the narrower and more specific sense of to harbor he stipulated was in fact required to 
define  ‘harbor [such] alien[s].’” Gries & Slocum, supra note 1, at 1449. They tell us that 
Posner could have done this either by providing “data that show that our frequency-based 
approach to ‘ordinary meaning’ is not borne out by other/more/better data,” or by providing 
“data showing that to harbor, when used with the human direct objects he uses as search terms, 
requires a new sense, one that is different from the general ‘providing space/a habitat for,’ 
because this general one is not good enough to cover to harbor’s use in the statute.” Id. at 
1449–50. 
 76.  Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 17, at 52–53. 
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direct object.77 But that analysis also is different than the analysis Lee 
and Mouritsen conduct. Gries and Slocum focus on the frequency 
with which “harbor” is used to refer to justifiable action that 
presents the harborer in a positive rather than a negative light.78 Lee 
and Mouritsen do not examine whether the harboring was justified. 
Instead, they look only at whether the search results showed that 
“harbor” was being used to mean “conceal” or “shelter.”79 
Gries and Slocum’s critique of Costello is even more puzzling 
because it looks quite different than their critique of Smith. The 
Court in Smith had to decide whether a defendant who traded a 
firearm for drugs fell within the scope of a criminal law that 
increased penalties for using a firearm during and in relation to a 
drug crime. Like the word “harbor,” the word “use” has a number 
of meanings. But Gries and Slocum’s primary analysis of the word 
“use” looked only at corpus data that involved weapons.80 They then 
analyzed that data to determine whether the word “use” includes the 
concept of trade or barter. Gries and Slocum also conduct a 
 
 77.  Gries & Slocum, supra note 1, at 1447–49. 
 78.  Gries and Slocum focus on the positive or negative portrayal because 
[Posner] defines to harbor . . . and then searches for to harbor + direct objects such 
as fugitives, refugees, and Jews, which are direct objects of the type that he stipulates 
in his definition, i.e. groups of humans that are justifiably harbored, and which 
portray the agent of harboring as positive. This, however, means that his ‘analysis’ 
also misses the fact that there are uses of to harbor that differ in their potential 
evaluative prosody: the use of harbor enemies is one in which harboring that kind of 
group of humans is probably not justified and portrays the harborer as negative. In 
our data, for instance, we found eighteen cases that are arguably ‘not to be 
protected, not worthy of protection, or harboring.’ The cases include terrorists, 
bandits, rebels, militants, pedophile priest, and more. In contrast, we found only nine 
patients of the type Posner restricted his analysis to, namely ones that are ‘to be 
protected/worthy of protection/harboring,’ which include Jews, some dedicated 
people, many of the priests, and a minor. Only four of our 453 instances involved 
harboring fugitives. 
Gries & Slocum, supra note 1, at 1450. Reading the Costello opinion, I do not see how 
Posner’s analysis turned on the justifiable or unjustifiable nature of the harboring. Someone 
who is harboring a fugitive—Posner’s most frequent result—is not necessarily acting justifiably. 
But that result does support his conclusion “that ‘harboring,’ as the word is actually used, has 
a connotation—which ‘sheltering,’ and a fortiori ‘giving a person a place to stay’—does not, of 
deliberately safeguarding members of a specified group from the authorities, whether through 
concealment, movement to a safe location, or physical protection.” Costello, 666 F.3d at 1044. 
 79.  Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 17, at 68. 
 80.  Gries & Slocum, supra note 1, at 1457–62. 
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secondary analysis of a small sample of search results in which “use” 
appeared in connection with a concrete object and find that none of 
those results employed “use” to mean trade or barter. 
As someone who is trained in law, not linguistics,81 I see the 
approach that Gries and Slocum take in their analyses of Costello and 
Smith as inconsistent. Why would the primary analysis of “to harbor” 
not be limited to humans when the primary analysis of “use” was 
limited to weapons? Even accounting for the secondary analyses, the 
approaches still seem inconsistent. The secondary analysis of “use” is 
limited to concrete objects; the analysis never sweeps as broadly as 
the analysis for “harbor,” which includes many nonconcrete objects. 
It is quite possible that the analyses Gries and Slocum performed 
conform to the best practices of their discipline. I am unable to 
judge whether the choices that they made would be accepted by 
linguistic experts as an appropriate or correct method to obtain 
corpus results. But whether their approach is defensible as a matter 
of linguistics methodology does not tell us how the law ought to 
view those results. 
At the very least, the different approaches that Gries and Slocum 
take to determine the most frequent meaning of “harbor” and the 
most frequent meaning of “use” demonstrate that humans must 
make these choices and that true linguistic experts will sometimes 
take different approaches to limiting their search results. That is 
extremely important for lawyers, judges, and academics who are 
evaluating corpus linguistics as a potential theory of statutory 
interpretation. It tells us that corpus linguistics will give us different 
answers depending on how we conduct our searches and that the 
experts who are qualified to undertake corpus searches and analyze 
the results do not have a single methodology for limiting those 
searches. In other words, corpus linguistics does not produce a single 
“right answer.” Instead, it requires judgment calls that must be made 
 
 81.  I received a B.A. in Linguistics from Columbia University in 1999, and I 
thoroughly enjoyed my undergraduate coursework. But the papers that I wrote on initial 
consonant clusters and the history of English letter names hardly give me the sort of 
specialized background that would be necessary to perform a competent corpus linguistics 
analysis of statutory terms. 
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by people. As a result, if corpus linguistics is adopted as a statutory 
interpretation theory, litigants will submit dueling corpus searches. 
Then judges—the people that Gries and Slocum tell us are not 
competent to undertake this task—will have to choose between 
those competing expert opinions. 
How to conduct the search is not the only subjective judgment 
involved in corpus linguistics. The analysis of search results is also 
fraught with choices. Take, for example, the corpus linguistics 
analysis that Justice Thomas Lee conducts in State v. Rasabout.82 The 
Rasabout case presented the question whether the term “discharge” 
in a criminal statute ought to be interpreted to mean firing a single 
shot from a firearm or to mean firing multiple shots if those shots all 
occurred at the same time.83 Justice Lee conducted a corpus search 
of the term “discharge” “within five words of the nouns firearm, 
firearms, gun, and weapon.”84 The search returned eighty-one 
results, and twelve of those results “clearly linked discharge to a 
single bullet.”85 Despite the fact that fewer than fifteen percent of the 
results clearly indicated that “discharge” was being used to mean 
“fire a single shot,” Justice Lee concluded “that the single shot sense 
of this verb is overwhelmingly the ordinary sense of the term.”86 This 
conclusion was based on how he interpreted the term “discharge” 
being used in other, more ambiguous results.87 In other words, 
 
 82.  State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 40, 356 P.3d 1258, 1271 (Lee, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). 
 83.  Id. ¶¶ 88–93, 356 P.3d at 1282. 
 84.  Id. ¶ 88, 356 P.3d at 1282. 
 85.  Id. ¶ 89, 356 P.3d at 1282. 
 86.  Id. ¶ 88, 356 P.3d at 1282 (“By examining the instances of discharge in connection 
with these nearby nouns, I confirmed that the single shot sense of this verb is overwhelmingly 
the ordinary sense of the term in this context.”) 
 87.  Justice Lee explained his interpretive choices as follows: 
  Twelve of the eighty-one hits in the COCA search clearly linked discharge to a 
single bullet. In sixteen other hits, the discharge was accidental. I deemed those hits 
as also consistent with the single shot sense of discharge, as it seems highly unlikely if 
not impossible that an accidental trigger-pull could result in a release of all of the 
bullets in a gun’s magazine. Fifteen other hits were a bit more ambiguous; but on 
closer examination, the discharge in question seemed to imply a single shot (based 
on the nature of the weapon, the circumstance of the discharge, or description of 
the resulting damage). 
Id. ¶ 89, 356 P.3d at 1282. 
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Justice Lee had to use his professional judgment—his judicial 
intuition—to interpret the corpus search results. 
Justice Lee is hardly the only person to use his subjective 
judgment in analyzing the results of a corpus search. Subjective 
judgment is a necessary feature of any corpus analysis. A recent paper 
on the meaning of the word “emolument” in the Constitution 
provides another example of how large a role subjective judgment 
plays.88 In their methodological section, the two authors explicitly 
note that, because they were likely to code results differently, they 
practiced in order to facilitate consistent coding. They independently 
coded material and then met to discuss why they had arrived at 
particular decisions.89 After multiple rounds of these practice coding 
sessions, they were agreeing only on how to code a particular result 
seventy percent of the time.90 If people who have specifically trained 
with one another to achieve consistent results nonetheless disagree 
with one another thirty percent of the time, then it is quite clear that 
corpus linguistics cannot give us “right answers.”  
Given the prominent role that personal judgment plays in 
analyzing corpus results, I find it difficult to understand the claim by 
corpus linguists that frequency analyses are “replicable and 
falsifiable” findings.91 When it is not immediately apparent how the 
statutory term is being used in a corpus search result, then the 
person analyzing the search result will have to rely on context and 
personal judgment to determine meaning. Context and personal 
judgment are precisely what judges currently use to decide the 
meaning of a statutory term. If corpus linguists think that this is an 
 
 88.  James Cleith Phillips & Sara White, The Meaning of the Three Emoluments Clauses 
in the U.S. Constitution: A Corpus Linguistic Analysis of American English, 1760–1799, 59 S. 
TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3036938. 
 89.  Id. at 26–27. 
 90.  Id. at 27. 
 91.  See, e.g., Justice Thomas Lee & Stephen Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning 
with Corpus Linguistics, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/08/08/judging-ordinary-meaning-with-corpus-linguisti 
cs/?utm_term=.738f3033613f (“Through corpus analysis we can test our hypotheses about 
language through rigorous experimentation with observable and quantifiable data and arrive at 
results that are replicable and falsifiable.”). 
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improper method for determining statutory meaning, then it is 
unclear why they want to reintroduce that very method of 
determining meaning many times over in the analysis of corpus 
search results. 
Of course, corpus linguistics is hardly alone as an interpretive 
theory in failing to give us a single right answer. Nor is it alone in 
relying on context and personal judgment to determine meaning. 
The difference is that the very raison d’être of corpus linguistics is 
that it supposedly minimizes subjectivity and discretion in the 
interpretive process.92 Because corpus searches do not have a single, 
accepted methodology, and because corpus analyses necessarily 
involve subjective judgment, corpus linguistics reintroduces the very 
flaws that its proponents seek to guard against.93 Corpus linguistics 
requires judges to make judgment calls, but it masks the import and 
the consequences of those judgment calls by changing the dispute to 
one about database searches and analysis rather than one about legal 
meaning and its consequences. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETIVE TOOLS 
Perhaps because they realize that corpus linguistics cannot give 
definitive answers, Gries and Slocum are careful to frame the corpus 
linguistics inquiry as something that could help judges determine a 
term’s meaning rather than as definitive proof of meaning.94 And I 
 
 92.  See supra notes 28–32; see also Mouritsen, Hard Cases, supra note 9, at 178 (“If 
statutory terms are to be applied consistently and predictably, their ordinary meaning cannot 
be determined introspectively.”). 
 93.  See Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 17, at 34 (praising 
corpus linguistics because “the results of a corpus-based conclusion will be replicable and 
falsifiable”); Mouritsen, Hard Cases, supra note 9, at 202 (praising corpus linguistics because it 
“remove[s] the question of ordinary meaning from the black-box of the judicial interpreter’s 
mind” and employs “a method that is quantifiable and verifiable”); Corpus Linguistics and 
Legal Interpretation–Event Audio/Video, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Jan. 23, 2017) (statement of 
Justice Thomas Lee at 24:10), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/videos/corpus-linguistics-
and-legal-interpretation-event-audio-video?autoplay=1 (praising corpus linguistics because it 
minimizes judicial discretion). 
 94.  E.g., Gries & Slocum, supra note 1, at 1423 (stating that corpus linguistics “would 
be useful to interpreters”); id. (stating that “linguistic insights from corpora” are “relevant to 
the questions courts ask (even if implicitly) when interpreting legal texts”). 
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imagine there are others who might balk at adopting corpus 
linguistics as an interpretive methodology, but who would 
nonetheless support its use as an additional tool for determining 
“ordinary meaning.”95 As I discuss more fully below, however, using 
corpus linguistics as a tool, rather than an interpretative 
methodology, may also have negative consequences. That is because, 
if corpus linguistics is used by textualists, then it may crowd out 
other interpretive tools. In particular, it could crowd out the rule of 
lenity and clear statement rules, which could deliver on corpus 
linguistics’ promise of increasing predictability and decreasing 
arbitrariness without sacrificing notice or accountability. 
By framing their frequency inquiry as a question about ordinary 
meaning, corpus linguists ensure that their methodology can be used 
in all statutory interpretations.96 Recall, textualists will look for the 
ordinary meaning of a statute first, and they will consider nontextual 
sources such as legislature history, policy considerations, practice, or 
canons of statutory construction only if the meaning of the statutory 
language is not plain from the text itself. Textualist judges may 
always consult a corpus frequency analysis to decide the meaning of a 
statute because corpus linguistics purports to tell us what the “plain” 
or “ordinary” meaning of a word is. One assumes that corpus 
linguistics will prove decisive in at least some cases, and thus some 
cases that might have moved to the second step of statutory 
construction will end at ordinary inquiry meaning. As a 
consequence, corpus linguistics will decrease the number of cases in 
which the courts turn to other nontextual sources of meaning.97 
 
 95.  See supra note 2. I distinguish between those who would use corpus linguistics as a 
tool to determine the permissible meanings of a statutory term from those who would use it to 
determine the “ordinary meaning.” Corpus searches give us information about how terms have 
been used in the past; that information seems like reliable evidence about how a term may be 
used by an ordinary English speaker, as opposed to how an ordinary English speaker is likely to 
understand the term to have been used in a particular statute. 
 96.  Indeed, those who advocate corpus linguistics as a theory of interpretation “see 
corpus linguistic analysis playing a central role in legal interpretation going forward.” Lee & 
Mouritsen, The Path Forward, supra note 2. 
 97.  Some might argue that corpus linguistics could be a tool for declaring more statutes 
ambiguous. And if that were the case, then corpus linguistics could result in more applications 
of the rule of lenity. (I am indebted to Stephen Mouritsen for this insight.) However, that is 
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This is unfortunate because there are nontextual sources of 
interpretation that, unlike corpus linguistics, could increase 
predictability without sacrificing notice or accountability. Specifically, 
courts could employ a more robust rule of lenity or they could 
employ clear statement rules in order to promote predictability. 
These rules actually strengthen notice and accountability while 
increasing predictability.98 
The rule of lenity tells judges that they should resolve ambiguity 
in criminal statutes in favor of defendants.99 And there are several 
cases in which judges have insisted on a clear, affirmative statement 
by the legislature in order to dispense with criminal mens rea.100 But 
courts do not use these interpretive tools consistently. The rule of 
lenity is, in many cases, a tool of last resort; courts will employ it 
only if all other interpretive tools have been exhausted.101 And while 
 
not how corpus linguistics has played out in practice. When faced with only twelve clear usages 
of the term “discharge,” for example, Justice Lee did not conclude that the statutory term was 
ambiguous in Rasabout. State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 56, 356 P.3d 1258, 1275 (Lee, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Instead, he found reasons to interpret less 
clear usages in a manner that confirmed his initial intuition about the meaning of the term. See 
supra text accompanying notes 81–87. Nor do I think that such an outcome is likely to be 
uncommon. Behavioral economists have shown that giving people a little bit of information 
may cause them to be (unwarrantedly) certain about decisions involving uncertainty and to 
make worse decisions than with less information. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 
On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 237 (1973) (demonstrating that people will 
make irrational decisions if given information that confirms their priors). 
 98.  See Fallon, supra note 13, at 1305 (“Pressed to articulate a prescriptive theory, I 
would provisionally offer this: in any case in which there is more than one linguistically and 
legally plausible referent for claims of legal meaning . . . , interpreters should choose the best 
interpretive outcome as measured against the normative desiderata of substantive desirability, 
consistency with rule of law principles, and promotion of political democracy, all 
things  considered.”). 
 99.  See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 
401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971). 
 100.  E.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618 (1994). 
 101.  See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (“[W]e have always 
reserved lenity for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s 
intended scope even after resort to ‘the language and structure, legislative history, and 
motivating policies’ of the statute.” (quoting Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 
(1980))); Bass, 404 U.S. at 347 (stating that a court should rely on lenity only if, “[a]fter 
‘seiz[ing] every thing from which aid can be derived,’” it is “left with an ambiguous statute” 
(quoting United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (1 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805))); see also Ortner, supra 
note 67, at 106–20 (tracing the decreasing force of lenity in court opinions); Zachary Price, 
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courts have occasionally required clear statements for mens rea, 
requiring such statements is hardly the norm. Whether courts will 
require a clear statement in order to dispense with a mens rea 
requirement depends on “the nature of the statute and the particular 
character of the items regulated.”102 There are also many other 
situations in which courts have not required clear statements.103  
Strengthening and expanding both lenity and clear statement 
rules could be used to improve notice, accountability, and 
predictability in the interpretation of criminal statutes.104 The rule of 
lenity improves notice because it ensures that defendants will not be 
convicted of violating a statute that could have reasonably been read 
to permit their conduct.105 Clear statement rules improve notice 
because they require legislatures to affirmatively and unambiguously 
indicate when they intend to impose criminal liability under 
particular circumstances. 
Both the rule of lenity and clear statement rules promote 
democratic accountability because they clarify the content of 
legislation. When legislatures are forced to better articulate their 
policies, voters are better able to understand the content of those 
policies and to hold their representatives accountable for those 
decisions.106 These rules also promote judicial accountability because 
they make clear that judges remain as a check on government power. 
The rule of lenity and clear statement rules—especially if they 
always apply—also help to constrain judicial discretion, thus ensuring 
 
The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 891 (2004) (noting that 
prevailing doctrine “ranks lenity dead last in the interpretive hierarchy”). 
 102.  Staples, 511 U.S. at 607. 
 103.  For example, they have not required clear statements regarding whether harsh 
penalties apply to individuals under the age of eighteen, even though they have recognized 
that such penalties appear to be unintended byproducts of statutory schemes rather than the 
intended consequences of legislative action. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 66–
67 (2010). 
 104.  See, e.g., Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY L.J. 
753 (2002) (arguing for a clear statement rule for punishment statutes in cases where 
culpability is unclear); Price, supra note 101 (arguing for a more robust rule of lenity). 
 105.  See Bass, 404 U.S. at 347. 
 106.  See generally Price, supra note 101 (arguing that the rule of lenity promotes 
democratic accountability because it ensures that voters have a clear sense of what criminal 
legislation prohibits). 
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consistency and predictability. That is not to say that these rules are 
neutral—they push the interpretation of criminal statutes to be 
narrower. But the rules help ensure that judges decide cases 
independently of their own idiosyncratic preferences. 
CONCLUSION 
Corpus linguistics is, at first glance, an attractive alternative to 
traditional statutory interpretation. It promises to use objective data 
and quantitative analysis to solve questions that have often prompted 
judicial disagreement. 
But a closer look at corpus linguistics reveals both its limitations 
and its drawbacks. Corpus linguistics does not eliminate the need for 
human judgment in conducting searches and analyzing results.107 
More importantly, as an interpretive theory, corpus linguistics 
fundamentally changes the nature of judicial interpretation. It tells us 
to interpret a statute based on how often a word is used a certain 
way rather than what an ordinary speaker would have understood 
that word to mean. In so doing, it creates a real risk that members of 
the public will not have notice about the scope of the law or be able 
to hold their representatives responsible for their policy choices. 
Corpus linguistics also minimizes the role that judges play in our 
constitutional system by making their interpretations appear 
ministerial rather than significant substantive actions for which 
judges should take responsibility. 
Our system could do more to increase the predictability of 
statutory interpretation. Especially when it comes to the 
interpretation of criminal laws, statutory construction should not 
seem like an arbitrary or idiosyncratic endeavor. But there are other 
methods courts could employ to increase the predictability of 
statutory interpretations—methods like more robust enforcement of 
 
 107.  “[Q]ualitative judgments form an integral part of [corpus linguistic’s] primarily 
data-driven approach. There are human beings at both ends of the corpus—the architect and 
the user—and both are subject to the same systematic errors and biases that affect every other 
member of the species.” Mouritsen, Hard Cases, supra note 9, at 203. 
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the rule of lenity or clear statement rules—that could increase 
predictability without decreasing notice or accountability. 
In our continuing quest to improve statutory interpretation, we 
should not forget that judicial statutory interpretation is a feature, 
rather than a bug, of our constitutional system. Judges interpret 
statutes not simply because someone has to do it but rather because 
it creates another opportunity for our system to check government 
power and promote individual liberty. There is value in requiring the 
legislature to speak especially clearly when writing criminal laws and 
in pushing back on creative executive enforcement decisions. 
Substantive judicial review helps to achieve these goals. But if we tell 
judges that they ought to perform that role by counting database 




 108.  Cf. Fallon, supra note 13, at 1306 (“[O]nce it is recognized that reasonably 
disputed claims of legal meaning cannot be resolved by appeal to any prelegal, linguistic fact of 
the matter, there is no alternative to the exercise of legally constrained normative judgment. 
Suggestions to the contrary are either false or misleading.”). 
